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Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants
ST~\TE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This \\·as an action for declaratory judgment to determine 'vhether the Utah Highway Patrol could validly
retain contributions made by Plaintiffs-Appellants to the
Utah Higlnvay Patrol Retirement Fund. Plaintiffs prayed
for a declaration for refund, based on favorable interpretations of l .... C. A. 49-8-1 to 49-8-5, as amended.
1
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson, Judge, Third Judicial District, sitting without jury. From a decree denying Plaintiffs' prayl~r,
Plaintiffs-Appellants appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs-Appellants seek reversal of the decree entered by the Trial Court and seek a further decree, declaring that Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to refund
of their contributions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs initiated action for declaratory judgment,
praying that the Trial Court declared the retention of
Plaintiffs' contributions to the Utah High"'\\"'ay Patrol
Retirement Fund by the Utah Commissioner of Finance
void and against public policy. Plaintiffs prayed for refund of the amounts contributed by them during their
employment.
The Defendants contended that a refund 'ras not
available because the statutes did not provide for a refund and by the absence of a provision for refund, the
legislature manifested its intention that such contributions by employees of the High,vay Patrol be forfeited
when employment is terminated prior to retirement age.
The Defendants also denied the refund on the basis that
the Plaintiffs, during their employment 'vith the High-
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way Pntrol, \\·C'rP advised of the forfeiture of any contri-

hnt ion~ n1ade hy t hP Plaintiffs and that the Plaintiffs
roH~Pnh•tl to such forfPiture.

ln ,·ic\v of the absence of any statutory provision
pt.'rtnitting or dPnying refund of contributions made by
Hi~hway Patrolmen, the primary problem at trial 'vas to
tlt'tt'rminP thP legislative intent in regard to possib]c
rt•fnnd~.

rrhroughout the trial, Plaintiffs contended that the
legislature intended a refund of contributions made hy
llig-hway Patrolmen, and a Statutory provision permitting ~neh refund was omitted by inadvertence and not by
th,~ign. This contention was based on the fact that the
h~g-i~laturc provided for a refund to all members and employPPs of other State, County and Municipal agencies.
Also. Plaintiffs contended that the Trial Court should
not construe a statute to permit forfeiture unless the
eYidenee at trial clearly showed a contract for forfeiture.
This contention is based on the policy established by the
tnajority of the Courts.
The Defendants, on the other hand, contended that
the Plaintiffs agreed to the forfeiture, and such agreement created a binding contract upon the Plaintiffs for
the forfeiture of all contributions made by Plaintiffs to
the lTtah HiglnYay Patrol Retirement Fund. The Defendants further contended that the legislature purposely
omitted provision for refund and that such omission
rP~ulted after the legislature carefully studied and ana-
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lyzed the actuarial reports presented to them of the
Highway Patrol Retirement program.
The Trial Court denied the Plaintiffs' petition for
dec-laratory judgment in their favor. The decision of the
Court was based on the finding that the statutory proYisions in question did not provide for a refund, as contrasted to the statutory provisions of the other retirement programs which permitted refund. The Court further found that the legislature intended that no refunds
be permitted in the interest of inducing employees of the
Highway Patrol Department to make a life career of the
Highway Patrol and to keep the retirement fund on a
sound basis.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF SEC. 49-8-1, ET SEQ., U. C. A.,
1953, AS AMENDED.
The pertinent statutory provisions in question,
48-8-1, et seq., U. C. A., 1953, as amended, create a retirement fund for male employees of the Utah High,vay
Patrol. The provisions of this statute do not provide for
or deny refund of contributions 'vhich are made by the
Highway Patrolmen when employment is terminated
before the employees qualify for retirement. Xotwithstanding the absence of any clear indication as to the
legislative intent regarding refunds of contributions, the
Trial Court determined that the Plaintiffs-1~ppellants
'vere not entitled to refund of their contribution to the
retirement fund. In effect, the Trial Court has adopted
a construction of the statute involved to permit a for4
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feiture without proof that the legislature, in fact, int .. nded a forfeiture.
The Ia"~ regarding forfeitures is clear and of long
~tnnding in tTta.h and in our sister states; the law abhors
forfeitures unless the statute or written agreement clearily indicatPs that a forfeiture " as intended.
7

In .1/or.flan v. Sorensen, 286 P. 2d 229 3 U. 2d 428,
t.he lTtah Supreme Court was confronted with a case involving the interpretation of a statute on forfeitures of
mining claims. In denying forfeiture, Justice Crockett,
~pl'aking for the majority, stated:
'' \\re should show the same liberality in construing
the suspension statute as has been used in con~truing the assessment work requirement, for the
same purpose of avoiding forfeitures, which are
re_qarded odious to the law." (Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court of California has also taken
the ,·ie"· that a. statute will not be construed to work a
forfeiture \vhich would work a harsh and unjust result
in absence of a clear indication by the legislature that it
~o intenrlPd. In Jfadera County v. Gendron, 382 P. 2d
:l-l~. 31 Cal. Rptr. 302, the California Supreme Court was
n~kPd to affirm a judgment which declared that because
tht' district attorney had violated a statute which prohibited pri,·ate practice, he had forfeited his pay as district attorney.
In reversing the Trial Court's decision, the Supreme
Court ~tated:
''To adopt the construction urged by the Plaintiff
would cause a. forfeiture, which 'vould work a
5
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harsh and unjust result; lre are reluctaut so to
construe the sta.tute in the absence of a clca r iurrication by the legislature that it so intended. (~l(·t
ropolitan Water District v. Adams (1948), :~~Cal.
2d 620, 197 P. 2d 543; Bakkenson v. Sup(~rior
Court (1925) 197 Cal. 504, 241 P. 847). To 'rithhold all salary from the District .1\ ttornev in order
to effectuate the section is to use a blu~1t inRtrument of enforcement, despite the availability of
more sensitive sanctions 'vhich may be tailored to
the nature and gravity of the breach.
"We hold, therefore, that the defendant may lawfully receive his salary during his term of office,
notwithstanding his failure to conform to the I>roscription upon engaging in the priYate practice of
I aw . . . "
The rule on forfeitures applies to contractual provisions as well as statutory provisions. In Grarnt v. Palfreyman, 166 P. 2d 215, 109 P. 291, our Supreme Court
was confronted with a claim of forfeiture on a construction contract. In reversing the Trial Court's judgment
for forfeiture, the Supreme Court of Utah held:
''Forfeitures are not favored and in interpreting
an agreement, every reasonable presumption
should be indulged against an intention to allo'v a
forfeiture." (See also: Swain v. Salt I.Jake Real
Estate Investment Company, 279 P. 2d 709, 3 U.
2d 121.)
In a California case involving the interprteation of
certain provisions in a contract, the Supreme Court of
California stated :
''The contract makes no provision for its termination or for the forfeiture of the interest of
6
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either party. If uo forfeiture is to occur b.lJ rirlltt' of a prorisiou of an agreement, surely noue
f'an be freated upon the demand and for the ac('nnunodafion of one of the parties." Plante v.
Oray, 157 I>. ~d 421, 68 CA 2d 582. (Emphasis
ndde(l)
In Uadach v. f>rior, 297 P. 2d 605, 48 vVash. 2d 901,
the ~npreme Court of Washington denied a forfeiture

nnd stated:
"Forfeitures are not favored in law, and equity
'"ill seize upon inequitable circumstances arising
from contract or conduct of the party in order to
nvoid a forfeiture."
The reference books are replete \vith annotations
of en~es denying the validity of forfeiture clauses in
contract, and the cases appear to generally hold that the
courts abhor forfeiture clauses and forfeiture as a remt'dy for the aggrieved. The language used in 12 A1n. Jur.,
rantracts. Section 436, appears to be the general attitude of all the Courts toward forfeitures. Portions of
this section read as follows:
'~Forfeitures

are not favored by law; indeed, they
are regarded "~ith disfavor. It is well settled that
forfeitures hy implication or by construction, not
compelled by express requirements, are regarded
\Yith disfavor. Contracts involving a forfeiture
cannot be extended beyond the strict and literal
meaning of the \Yords used. Since forfeitures ~~re
not favored either in equity or in law, provisionG
for forfeitures are to receiYe, \Yhere the intent is
doubtful, a strict construction against those for
""hose benefit they are introduced. Courts are reluctant to declare and enforce a forfeiture, if by

7
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reasonable interpretation it can be aYoided.'' ( pp.
1016-17). For further reference, see Par. Dig.
CONTRACTS, Key No. 3, Sec. 18.
It is obvious that the law as to forfeitures is a firm
and established rule, even in cases \vhere the parties
have by writing agreed to the forfeiture. Certainly, in
cases where no writing can be produced to establish tlw
forfeiture, and the pertinent statutes are silent as to thr
intent of the legislature, the Court should not establish a
forfeiture agreement merely on the demand of one party:
nor should the Court infer from the statutes that thP
legislature, in fact, intended a forfeiture \vhere ~uch f< 11'geitures are frowned upon by the Courts and the presumption lies against forfeitures .
.&.~t

trial, the defendants offered several argument~ rPgarding statutory constn1ction \vhich may \\"'arrant consideration here.
Initially, defendants argued that since no provif4ion
for refund "'as made by the legislature, the legislature
must have intended a forfeiture. Ho\V0Yer, it is equally
feasible to believe that a provision for refund "~a~ inadYertently omitted, and this, especially, since the provisions for all other retirement funds permit at least partial refund.
The defendants also argue that the ''mention of one
thing implies the exclusion of another.', As rules for
statutory interpretations go, the Plaintiffs offer no rebuttal to this maxim. This rule, how·ever, is inapplicable
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hen', since the entire controversy arises from the fact

that the legislature did not ''mention'' anything in regard
to rt-fund of contributions. Defendants further contended that when the language is clear and unambiguous, no
other intPrpretation is permitted. Again, this rule is inapplicable here, as the conflict arises not from ambiguity
of 'vords, but the absence of it.
Defendants next contended that the presumption of
constitutionality rests with each statute until such presumption is overcome by clear evidence. The Plain tiffs
do not deny that such is the rule, but merely urge that a
statute should not be construed to effectuate a forfeiture
without clear eYidence that the legislature intended such
a forfeiture.
Finally, Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs have
no \·ested interest in the retirement fund and are, therefore, not entitled to refund. The Plaintiffs have never
claimed any vested interest in the retirement fund, as
~neb. They merely contended that they have an interest
a~ to their respective contributions to the fund. Certninly, Plaintiffs have not met the requirements for retirement and are, therefore, not entitled to any retirement benefits from the retirement fund. On the other
hand, the contributions made by Plaintiffs were made out
nf their 'vages. This amount was part of their monthly
eompensation and as such, should be returned to them.
Such a refund would not be unprecedented, notvvithstanding the absence of statutory authority, and would merely
be a refund of " .. ages 'vithheld.
9
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In Sommers v. Patton, 399 Ill. 540, 478 N.E. 2d 31:1,
an employee demanded return of his conribution to retirement fund which was classified as a public employee
fund. The custodian of the retirement fund denied the
refund. In permitting the refund, the Illinois Supreme
Court stated that the refund 'vas, in fart, a final releHf-;P
for prior \Yage deductions.
The defendants urged that the legislature purpose]~·
omitted a refund clause in creating the Utah Higlnray
Patrol retirement because all other retirement funds specifically provide for refund of contributions, and had thP
legislature intended refund, the statute would have so
provided. Yet the opposite of this is equally logical. All
other retirement funds were created prior to the Highway Patrol Retirement Fund, and it ""ould seem to follow that the legslature intended to give all public employees a refund of their contributions if employment
was voluntarily terminated; that the legislature inadvertently failed to provide for refund in this case. Since
all other retirement funds for governmental employees of
Utah are allowed refund, it would seem that the High""ay Patrol should not be excepted, unless specifically
excepted b~,. statute. In 50 Anl. Jur., ~C,'fatutes, Section :1~G,
in regard to the legislatiYe silence or acquiescence~ it i~
stated that ''It is the general rule that the intent of the
legislature is indicated b~· its action, not by its failure to
act.'' Further, at 50 _A 111. Ju r., Statutes, Section 348, the
authors state:
''It is a fundamental rule of statutory constrnrtion that sections and acts in pari materia, and all
parts thereof, should be construed together, and

10
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compared "ith each other. No one act, or portion
of all the nets, should be singled out for considPrntion apart from all the legislation on the subjPet. Under this rule, each statute or section .is
eonstrued in the light of, with reference to, or 1n
eonnection with, other statutes or sections. Recourse is had to the several statutes or sections for
the purpose of arriving at a. correct interpretation
of any particular one. The object of the rule is
to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of
the legislature. It proceeds upon the supposition that the several statutes were governed by
one spirit and policy, and were intended to be
consistent and harmonious in their several parts
and provisions.''
Section 349 of the same volume and heading reads as
follows:
''Under the rule of statutory construction of
statutes in pari materia, statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of la,v, but as a
'vhole, or a.s parts of a great, connected homogeneous system, or a single and complete statutory
arrangement. Such statutes are considered as if
they constituted one act, so that sections of one
act may be considered a.s though they were parts
of the other act, a.s fa.r as this can reasonably be
done. Indeed, as a general rule, where legislation
dealing 'vith a. particular subject consists of a
system of related general provisions indicative of
a settled policy, new enactments of a. fragmanta.ry
nature on that subject are to be taken as intended
to fit into the existing system and to be carried
into effect conformably to it, and they should be
so construed as to harmonize the general tenor or
purport of the system and make the scheme consistent in all parts and uniform in its operation,
unless a different purpose is shown plainly or with
11
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irresistible clearness. It 'vill be assumed or prrsumed, in the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not
intend to innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or
violate a. general statute or system of stautory provisions the entire subject matter of which is not
directlv
•' or necessarilY
. involved in the art ."
Section 350 reads :
''Although there may be statutory proYISions
which, in a sense, relate to the same rna tter and
yet, are not in pari materia, thP general rule i~
that statutes or statuory provisions ·w·hich relatP
to the same person or thing, or to the same clas~
of persons or things, or to the same or a closel~·
allied subject or object, may be regarded as pari
materia. Statutes which have a common purpose,
or the same general purpose, or are parts of the
same general scheme or plan, or are aimed at tlw
accomplishment of the same results and the suppression of the same evil, are also ordinarily regarded as in pari material. This is true of statutes which have for their common purpose the
carrying out specifiically of the mandate of the
same constitutional provision.''
By these rules of statutory interpretation, the statutory provisions of the High"ray Patrol Retirement Fund
would have to be analyzed in conjunction w·ith all of Title
49, U. C. A., 1953, as amended, since all section~ and
chapters under Title 49 deal specifically 'vith retirement
funds for State and governmental employees. The logical conclusion from such analysis would be that the legislature intended to give all such employees, including
High,vay Patrolmen, a refund of their respective contributions to their retirement funds "?hen the employees

12
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terminated employment prior to meeting the requiremeut~ for rPtirPment.
The Trial .Judge ha.s held and the defendants urged
that the legislature omitted a refund clause because it
intended that the retirement fund be kept on a. sound
ba~is. It \vould seem that the legislature intended that
all retirement funds be kept on a. sound financial basis.
'rhP judgment of the Trial Court also indicates that the
legislature intended to induce HiglT\vay Patrolmen to
make the Highway Patrol Department a life career. It
would appear that the legislature intended to induce all
State and other governmental employees to make their
johs life rareers. The very existence of all of the retirement funds would seem to indicate that the legislature
intended to induce permanent employment with governmental agencies. It does not follow that the absence
of a refund rlause is a special indication by the legislature
that it intended the forfeiture of contributions if Highway Patrolmen decided to terminate their services with
that Department. The inducement, if any, would seem
to be the creation of the fund - not the absence of a
refund cia use.
Xo evidenc-e "~as presented a.t the trial upon which
the Trial Court's judgment could be supported. The
judgment rendered below, denying Plaintiffs' prayer for
refuntl. effects a forfeiture without clear evidence that
the legislature intended a forfeiture.
The Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Trial
Court's ruling is simply the declaration of a forfeiture

'
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'vhich is not supported by evidence or ~tatute; and tlll
judgment should, therefore, be reversed, and a judgment
entered, declaring Plaintiffs eligible for refund of their
contributions.

1

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Trial Court is simply a declaration permitting forfeiture of Plaintiffs' contributions to
the Utah Highway Patrol Retirement Fund. The judgment is not supported by evidence and should, therefore,
be reversed, and a judgment entered, declaring Plaintiffs eligible for refund.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH M. HISAT"'"t\J\:E
445 East Second South, No. 7
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellants
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